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In this paper, we test the hypothesis that higher economic development is associated with
lower trade costs. Using exports from 103 Italian provinces to 188 countries over the period
1995-2004, we estimate distance elasticity, our measure of trade costs, through a gravity
equation model of bilateral trade derived by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). We use
different methods to control for multilateral resistance. Results corroborate our hypothesis.
We find that heterogeneity of trade costs in Italian provinces is high and that it is negatively
associated with economic development.
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HETEROGENEITY OF TRADE COSTS 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we test the hypothesis that higher economic development is associated with lower 
trade costs. Using exports from 103 Italian provinces to 188 countries over the period 1995-2004, 
we estimate distance elasticity, our measure of trade costs, through a gravity equation model of 
bilateral trade derived by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). We use different methods to control 
for multilateral resistance. Results corroborate our hypothesis. We find that heterogeneity of trade 
costs in Italian provinces is high and that it is negatively associated with economic development.  
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There is strong evidence on the impact of trade costs (TCs) on international trade (Anderson and 
van Wincoop, 2004, AvW henceforth) and on the location of production facilities. In the economic 
geography  literature,  pecuniary  spillovers  trigger  a  “circular  causation”  process  leading  to  the 
endogenous formation of a richer industrial core and a poorer agricultural periphery (Krugman, 
1991); agglomeration deepens as transportation costs decline. Other causes of agglomeration are 
cost and demand linkages (Venables, 1996) and innovation (Martin and Ottaviano, 2001). There is 
historical evidence that economic growth is associated with rapid urbanization, spatial disparities 
and  rising  income  inequality  (Kuznets,  1966).  Spatial  disparities  are  also  evident  today  in  fast 
growing emerging economies. The posited negative correlation between development and TCs is 
the  natural  extension  of  the  core-periphery  model  when  more  cores  and  more  peripheries  are 
considered, that is when there is provincial heterogeneity. 
To test our hypothesis, we proxy TCs with distance. In general, TCs rise with distance because 
of transportation costs. Consequently, close countries tend to trade more than distant countries. 
However,  there  is  more  than  transportation  in  distance.  Common  language  (Helliwell,  1999; 
Hutchinson,  2002),  common  colonial  roots  (Rauch  1999),  shared  religion  (Kang  and  Fratianni, 
2006), immigrant links to the home country (Gould, 1994; Head and Ries, 1998) or more generally 
ethnic networks (Rauch and Trindade, 2001), and similarity in economic development (Fratianni 
and Kang, 2006) are trade-enhancing characteristics that counteract transportation costs. Beyond 
culture, cross-border trade is influenced by institutions such as regional trade agreements (Carrère, 
2006; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007) and common money (Rose, 2000; Rose and van Wincoop, 2001; 
Frankel  and  Rose,  2002).  Last  but  not  least,  national  borders  are  a  big  impediment  to  trade 
(McCallum, 1995; Helliwell, 1998; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Chen, 2004). Using standard 
trade-enhancing factors to control cultural and institutional factors, we test our hypothesis with 
provincial export data from Italy. It is a country known for its North-South divide that goes back to 
the very beginning of the nation and persists to these days despite large government transfers to the 
South (Lutz, 1962; Bagnasco, 1977; Becattini, 2007). Because of high heterogeneity in economic 
development, Italy is a natural candidate for our purpose. 
Our research strategy is to estimate gravity equations (GE) using bilateral trade between 103 
Italian  provinces  and  partner  countries  imposing  the  strong  assumption  that  each  province  is 
distinctive only in its degree of economic development. The implication is that the elasticity of 
exports with respect to provincial TCs (simply, TC elasticity), our measure of TCs, is negatively 
related to provincial per-capita income, our synthetic measure of economic development. In Section 
II,  we  discuss  the  general  form  of  GE  in  the  presence  of  multilateral  TCs.  In  Section  III,  we 
formulate the model. Section IV is devoted to data. Findings are analyzed in Section V. Conclusions 
are drawn in the last section. 
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2. THE GRAVITY EQUATION AND MULTILATERAL TRADE COSTS 
 
In a well-known paper, McCallum (1995) applied a GE to 1988 exports and imports among ten 
Canadian provinces and thirty U.S. states and found that inter-provincial trade was approximately 
twenty times larger than trade between provinces and states; in essence, the US-Canadian border is 
very thick.  
AvW (2003) criticized McCallum’s findings mostly for ignoring multilateral TCs. They argue 
that general-equilibrium considerations dictate that trade flows from region i to region j depend, 
among other factors, not only on bilateral TCs but also on multilateral ones.
1 When multilateral 
costs rise  relative to bilateral costs, trade  flows rise between i  and j.  These  authors derive the 
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where x = exports from i to j, y = nominal income, t = bilateral TC factor, P = multilateral TC factor 
(i.e., consumer price index), σ = elasticity of substitution among goods, and i, j, and W indicate, 
respectively, exporter country, importer country and the world. Assuming that tij is a function of 
bilateral distance and one plus the tariff-equivalent bilateral border barrier, AvW estimate with 
nonlinear least squares a simultaneous system of equations on cross-section data. Their main result 
is that borders reduce trade in the range of 20 to 50 percent, that is much less than the border found 
by McCallum. 
The AvW estimation procedure is rather cumbersome and other authors have sought simpler 
alternatives. Baier and Bergstrand (2007), using cross-section data, obtain virtually identical results 
with  bonus  vetus  (good  old)  OLS  using  a  first-order  log-linear  Taylor  series  expansion  to 
approximate multilateral resistance with appropriate exogenous variables captured by country fixed 
effects (FE henceforth). Egger (2000) proposes for panel data a three-way FE: importer country, 
exporter  country,  and  time.  Baldwin  and  Taglioni  (2006)  take  a  broader  look  at  the  issue  and 
identify three estimation errors with GEs, stemming primarily from multilateral trade factors. To 
each error the authors assign prizes in the form of Olympic medals. The bronze medal goes for 
using real GDPs, as opposed to nominal GDPs. The multilateral trade factors are not well identified 
and the model errors fail to be orthogonal to the regressors, with the consequence that the OLS 
estimator is asymptotically downward biased.
2 The silver medal, assigned for a more serious error, 
goes for employing two-way bilateral trade. Since the GE is a modified expenditure function with a 
market-clearing condition, the theory explains only one-way bilateral trade and not two-way trade. 
This error leads to an overestimate of bilateral trade and larger error variance, which is particularly 
severe in panel data. Finally, the gold medal goes for omitting altogether the multilateral resistance 
factor. Following Rose and van Wincoop (2001), Feenstra (2003), and Cheng and Wall (2003), 
Baldwin and Taglioni propose country dummies in cross-section data and country-pair FE in panel 
data  to  solve  the  gold  medal  error.
  However,  country-pair  dummies  are  time-invariant  and 
consequently can only in part resolve the gold medal error; serial correlation remains. It should be 
added  that  pair  dummies  capture  all  FE,  including  distance  elasticity,  making  it  impossible  to 
distinguish among parameters of various time-invariant variables.  
The alternative is provided by Carrère (2006) who shows the merit of modelling pair dummies 
as random effects (RE henceforth). In sum, with pair RE we can estimate the impact of distance on 
trade and avoid receiving the gold medal. 
 
                                                 
1 The immediate predecessor of Anderson and van Wincoop is Anderson (1979). Other theoretical foundations of GE 
are provided by Bergstrand (1985, 1989), Deardorff (1998), Helpman (1987), and Haveman and Hummels (2004). 
2 Other problems arise also from differences among price deflators (traded and non-traded goods) and price indices of  
traded goods.    3 
 
3. GRAVITY EQUATION MODEL 
 
Our strategy goes as follows. Distance elasticity is estimated directly for each of the 103 Italian 
provinces using a GE. In addition, border elasticity is estimated to be the same for those provinces 
that are adjacent to foreign countries. The sum of distance and border elasticities defines province-
specific TC elasticity, which is then correlated with provincial per-capita income to see whether 
there is an inverse relationship between TCs and economic development. The other factors are 
common to all provinces.  
Define TCs of the i
th Italian province to the j
th country as follows (for similar specification, see 
Carrère (2006)):  
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where dij is bilateral distance, RTA (InterRTA) is a dummy that assumes 1 when i and j belong to the 
same (different) regional trade agreement, MONEY and BORDER are dummies that assume 1 when 
i and j share the same money or a land border. Institutional and cultural factors such as common 
language, colonial relationships and immigrant links are irrelevant and have been omitted.
3 RTA, 
InterRTA, and MONEY are relevant but are common to all provinces; hence, we drop subscript i.  
BORDER is also relevant but affects only some Northern provinces; hence, subscript i has been 
retained while t has been dropped because this variable is time-invariant over the period. As to the 
signs of the coefficients, ρ0  is positive and ρ3 and ρ4 are negative. The signs of ρ1 and ρ2, instead, 
depend on whether the RTA is trade creating or trade diverting. If the RTA is trade creating, both ρ1 
and ρ2 are negative; if the RTA is trade diverting ρ1 is negative but ρ2 is positive (Carrère, 2006). 
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t P P y A   is  the  multilateral  TC  factor  and  Zf  is  the  set  of  three  TCs  that  are 
common to all provinces plus one TC that is common to Northern provinces adjacent to other 
countries  (Z1=RTA,  Z2=InterRTA,  Z3=MONEY  and  Z4=BORDER).  Province-sensitive  distance 
elasticity  0 0 ) 1 ( r s b - =  is negative since the elasticity of substitution σ is larger than unity; the 
four  semi-elasticities  f f r s b ) 1 ( - =   are  positive,  except  for  β2  <  0  when  the  RTA  is  trade 
diverting;  ijt t ijt u e m + = , where  t is a year dummy and εijt is an idiosyncratic error.  
We  modify  general  specification  (3)  replacing  distance  on  the  right-hand  side  with  the 
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where I is the number of provinces and δ(i) is a province dummy. Province-specific TC elasticities 
are: 
                                                 
3 Italian, as the majority’s language, is only spoken in Italy. Catholicism is the prevalent religion. Colonial relationships 
with former colonies Libya, Somalia and Eritrea were too short lived to be of any relevance. Emigrants’ relationships 
are primarily with the home country. Furthermore, these relationships have diminished over time and are captured in 
our model by country fixed effects.   4 
 
βS,i = β0,i + β4,i *  ij BORDER ,           (5) 
 
where  ij BORDER  is the frequency of common-land border trade in total trade of province i. Mean-
adjusted βS,i are then regressed on average per-capita income of province i, Yi/Ni, to see whether 
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Our  methodology  is  closer  to  the  “bonus  vetus  OLS”  of  Baier  and  Bergrstrand  than  to  the 
nonlinear least square estimation of AvW. However, we avoid receiving any medals in the Baldwin-
Taglioni mistake race. With respect to the gold medal, we control for multilateral resistance using 
(a) two-way FE, (b) province-country pair RE and (c) combined procedure of two-way FE and 
province-country pair RE. In each case we add year dummies.  
Method  (a)  is  a  two-way  FE  including  importer  country  and  year  dummies.  Egger  (2000) 
proposes a three-way FE model, where the third FE is the exporter country dummy. We cannot 
implement  a  three-way  FE  model  because  the  provincial  FE  are  collinear  with  the  interacting 
variable between distance and province. Method (b) applies specific effects to province-country 
pairs but not to individual exporter and importer countries. We use RE to model pair specific effects 
to avoid their collinearity with distance (Carrère 2006). In the last method, we combine (a) and (b). 
Our method (c) encompasses all time-invariant multilateral resistance factors. Method (b) captures 
the bulk of specific effects, and thus is less consistent than (c). Both (b) and (c) are based on the 
assumption that province-country pairs behave randomly and thus permit us to estimate distance 
coefficients for each of the 103 Italian provinces. Method (a) controls only for importer country FE; 
it is better than a pure OLS since the latter fails to control for all specific effects (Egger 2000). 
Moreover, we avoid also the silver medal because our dependent variable are exports and not two-
way trade flows. Finally, we avoid the bronze medal because we employ nominal GDP instead of 
real GDP. 
We test our hypothesis using estimated distance coefficients as dependent variable. We eliminate 
potential systematic biases by taking mean-adjusted values of the estimated coefficients. But we 
cannot  avoid  heteroskedasticity  that  is  present  in  equation  (6).  Saxonhouse  (1976)  suggests  to 
substitute (6) in (4) and to employ a feasible generalized least squares estimator on the resulting 
equation. Unfortunately, we cannot implement his procedure because of the strong correlation that 
exists between provincial per-capita income and provincial income.
4 This correlation increases the 
size of the standard errors and yields inefficient estimates of equation (6). Nonetheless, we are able 





Our dataset consists of 130,321 observations covering 103 Italian provinces and 188 countries over 
the  period  1995-2004.  The  data  come  from  different  sources.  Annual  exports  by  province  and 
country are from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT); they include all bilateral flows 
in excess of one euro recorded by custom offices. As already mentioned, we avoid the silver medal 
in the mistake race by considering only exports. On the other hand, we cannot avoid magnifying the 
                                                 
4 Population is relatively stable in the Italian provinces over the sample period.   5 
effects of vertical specialization (Hummels, Ishii and Yi, 2001). A bias is generated by re-exporting, 
which  occurs  when  part  of  the  intermediate  production  process  is  localized  abroad.  In  these 
instances,  export  data  overestimate  the  true  but  unknown  value  of  exports  (AvW,  2004).  We 
eliminate sector “Ships and aircrafts, etc.” because it lacks a specific destination and exports to 
politically  undefined  areas  (e.g.,  Antarctica)  or  remote  parts  of  a  country  (e.g.,  Denmark’s 
Greenland). ISTAT is also the source of provincial population and income, the latter measured as 
the sum of value added in agriculture, industry and service except the public sector and financial 
services.  
Country income and population come from the World Development Indicators 2007 (WDI) of 
the World Bank. We lose some records in merging the two datasets because of the mismatching 
between ISTAT export destination and WDI country definition (e.g., Timor-Leste). We lose records 
because  income  is  not  reported  for  some  countries  (e.g.,  Brunei  and  Cuba).  These  inevitable 
trimmings,  however,  are  of  little  consequence  for  the  final  research  outcome.  Variable  dij  is 
measured as the kilometric geodesic distance between province i‘s capital and country j’s capital.
 5 
Data on provincial latitude and longitude are provided by the official sites of each province; data 
on capitals’ latitude and longitude are from the World Factbook of the Central Intelligence Agency.   
As to institutional factors, we define 11 separate RTAs, with year of entry and exit of each 
member.
6 Italy is a member of the European Union and when a province trades with a country that 
is a member of another RTA, the InterRTA dummy is equal to one. Information on common money, 
the euro, comes from the European Commission.  
Table I presents descriptive statistics of our dataset. Average provincial income is $11.3 billion 
(Panel  A)  vs.  an  average  country  income  of  $168.3  billion  (Panel  B)
7;  15.5  percent  of  Italian 
provinces have a common land border with foreign countries; 7.1 percent of provincial trade flows 
go to members of the European Union; 3.2 percent to countries that share the same currency (the 
euro); and 28 percent to countries affiliated with other RTAs. Panel C gives descriptive statistics in 
relation to aggregate provincial exports. Average incomes rise in Panel C because of the higher 
frequency  of  high-income  areas,  which  tend  to  export  more  than  low-income  areas.  The  same 
occurs for the number of trade relations among RTA members as a proportion of maximum bilateral 
relations and for the share of common money countries. The incidence of common border loses 
relative to other institutional factors. Average distance is 5,231 km. Average provincial exports are 
$19.5 billion. There is no selection bias because ISTAT reports all export values. Figure 1 shows 
that  provincial  exports  have  a  profile  consistent  with  a  log-normal  distribution.  In  the  GE  the 




Table II presents the results from GE estimations. Our panel estimates use a cluster correction for 
the  province-country  pair  and  robust  standard  errors.  The  former  reduces  potential  pair  serial 
correlation and the latter corrects for potential heteroschedasticity. Table III shows some statistical 
tests on the three methods. Under method (a), the likelihood ratio test reveals that the importer 
country FE provide significant explanatory power. The restriction that time FE are zero is rejected. 
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where the average earth radius r is 6,371 km, acos(x) is the radian value of the arc-cosine of x, i is the province, j is the 
country, and lat and lon indicate respectively latitude and longitude. The maximum error between real and geodesic 
distance is less than 20 km. 
6 They are European Union, U.S-IS, NAFTA, CARICOM, PATCRA, ANZCERTA, CACM, MECOSUR, ASEAN, 
SPARTECA, and ANDEAN; see Oh (2006). 
7 The range from $1.3 to $154.8 billion for provinces and from $ 0.041 to $11,711.8 billion for country income (with 
respective standard deviations of $15.8 and $812.5 billion) indicates high income variability.   6 
These findings are in line with Egger’s (2000) results and are consistent with the two-way FE 
model.  Under  (b)  and  (c),  we  assume  RE  on  province-country  pairs.  The  Hausman  (1978) 
specification tests to discriminate between FE and RE failed because of the high number of groups 
(16,629) in our sample. Instead, we relied on the Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (1979, BPLM 
for short) tests, which reject the null hypothesis of zero-variance implied by the FE model in favor 
of the alternative RE model under both methods (see Table II). In other words, BPLM tests do not 
reject our assumption of province-country pair RE. 
Provincial and country income elasticities have the expected signs and are statistically significant 
even if they are individually different from one, a result that is in contrast with theory but accords 
with much of the empirical literature; see table II. The RTA semi-elasticity is statistically positive  
in two out of the three methods but the size is very sensitive to the methodology.
8 The negative 
InterRTA semi-elasticity in two out of the three methods suggests trade diversion, but the size, like 
for the RTA coefficient, is very sensitive to the chosen methodology. The MONEY semi-elasticity is 
statistically  positive  but  of  low  economic  impact.
9  The  BORDER  semi-elasticity  is  statistically 
positive,  stable  through  the  different  methods,  and  economically  relevant.
10  The  103  distance 
elasticities interacting with provinces are all negative and statistically very significant, individually 
as well as jointly. The average distance elasticity is -1.268 under method (a), -1.037 under method 
(b), and -1.388 under method (c). Variability across provinces is high, ranging from a minimum of 
738 . 1 -  for Cosenza, in the South, under method (c) to a maximum of  840 . 0 -  for Vercelli, in the 
North, under method (b). Clearly, there is more than transportation costs in distance. Finally, the 
regressions explain a great portion of the export variance and confirm the empirical robustness of 
the GE also at a highly (geographical) disaggregated level.  
The impact of TCs on exports is the sum of distance, BORDER, RTA, InterRTA, and MONEY 
elasticities, with the last three being common to all Italian provinces. In our model, this impact for 
the northern province of Vercelli, using method (b), is the sum of its own distance elasticity, -0.840, 
its own  BORDER elasticity, 0.0008, and the three common (to all provinces) elasticities that add up 
to 0.0565; that is, -0.7828. For the southern province of Cosenza, TC elasticity, using method (c), is 
the sum of its own distance elasticity, -1.738, plus the three common elasticities that add up to -
0.2163; that is,  9543 . 1 - .
11 Naturally, in comparing provinces, the common TCs drop out and one is 
left with the sum of  distance and border elasticities. Distance elasticity accounts, on average, for 
about 99 percent of province-specific TCs. 
To test our main hypothesis, we regress mean-adjusted provincial TC elasticities on average 
provincial  per-capita  income.  Estimated  results  are  shown  in  Table  IV.  We  correct  for 
heteroskedasticity in equation (6) either with (i) robust standard errors or (ii) a bootstrap method. 
For the latter, we tried 100, 1,000, and 10,000 replications. We report only  results from 1,000 
replications. Standard errors are virtually the same under both (i) and (ii).  
We  show  scatter  plots  in  the  [βS,i  -  i S, b ,  Yi/Ni]  space  and  fitted  lines  for  each  of  the  three 
methods in Figure 2. The fitted lines are positive and statistically very significant: provinces with 
lower (i.e., more negative) than average TC elasticities, such as Cosenza, are associated with lower 
per-capita income, while provinces with higher (i.e., less negative) than average TC elasticities, 
                                                 
8 We recall that method (a) uses country fixed effects, method (b) country pair random effects, and method (c) country 
fixed effects and country pair random effects. All methods use year dummies. 
9 For example, the exponent of 0.061 (the estimated MONEY coefficient under method (c)) is 1.06, suggesting that  
common money raises exports by 6 percent. The effects of common money on trade reported by Rose (2000), Rose and 
van Wincoop (2001), and Frankel and Rose (2002) are much higher. There is a considerable controversy on this subject.  
10 For example, the exponent of 0.507 (the estimated BORDER coefficient under method (c)) means that a common 
border raises exports by 66 percent. 
11 For Cosenza, BORDER is zero and the RTA coefficient is not statistically different from zero.   7 
such as Vercelli, are associated with higher per-capita income.
12 In essence, developing provinces 
face higher TCs than developed provinces.  
In sum, the evidence supports our hypothesis that TCs and economic development are inversely 
related  in  Italy.  Development  patterns  appear  to  be  consistent  with  the  main  implications  of 
agglomeration theory: developed and richer provinces occur more frequently in the industrial North 
than in the still developing South. These patterns are shown visually in Figure 3, where Italian 
provinces are coded according to the values of the estimated provincial TC elasticities. With few 
exceptions, provinces in the “First Italy” (North-West) and “Third Italy” (North-East and parts of 
the Center) face lower TCs than provinces in the developing South; these results are consistent with 




The key result of the paper is that economic development is associated with lower trade costs. 
Using different methods to control for multilateral resistance, we apply a gravity equation to exports 
from 103 Italian provinces to 188 countries over the period 1995-2004. In each method, we fail to 
reject  our  hypothesis  that  trade  costs  are  inversely  related  to  economic  development.  We  have 
measured the impact of trade costs on exports as the sum of two province-specific elasticities, 
distance and border, and three other elasticities –RTA, InterRTA, and MONEY– that are common to 
all Italian provinces.  
We contribute to the economic literature in two way: (i) we verify the robustness of the gravity 
equation for bilateral trade at the provincial level; (ii) we find trade costs to be heterogeneous within 
a country. In the future, we plan to explore possible asymmetries in “common” trade costs, the 
conjecture being that the effects of the European Union and of the euro are felt differently across 
Italian provinces. 
 
                                                 
12 While the slope coefficients of the graphs appear low (ranging from 0.0194 to 0.0223), it should be remembered that 
we correlate a pure number like elasticity with a level variable like per-capita income.   8 
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Table I: Descriptive Statistics (millions of US dollars for Exports, Yi and Yj) 
   Mean  Median  Stand.Dev.  Min  Max 
Panel A 
(N=103)                
Yi  11,315.7  6,967.2  15,809.2  1,284.0  154,822.0 
BORDER  0.155  0  0.362  0  1 
Panel B 
(N=188)                
Yj  168,332.7  8,089.5  812,480.3  40.8  11,711,833.7 
RTA  0.071  0  0.257  0  1 
Inter-RTA  0.280  0  0.449  0  1 
MONEY  0.032  0  0.176  0  1 
BORDER  0.022  0  0.147  0  1 
Panel C 
(N=130,321)                
Exports  19.5  0.7  108.9  3x10
-6  5,238.2 
Yi  13,135.2  7,848.3  17,968,2  1,284.0  154,821.9 
Yj  238,517.9  18,672.6  965,930.3  40.8  11,711,833.7 
Distance  5,231  4,444  3,862  69  18,932 
RTA  0.104  0  0.305  0  1 
Inter-RTA  0.232  0  0.422  0  1 
MONEY  0.050  0  0.218  0  1 
BORDER  0.001  0  0.036  0  1 
Note: Panel A: statistics on provinces (i=103, j=1, t=10); Panel B: statistics on countries (i=1, j=188, t=10); 
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Note: 130,321 observations. I=103, J=188, T=10. 
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Table II: Distance interacting with Provinces. Period 1995-2004 (N=130,321) 
COEFFICIENT  (a)  (b)  (c)  COEFFICIENT  (a)  (b)  (c) 
Year Dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  d*Massa-Carrara  -1.082  -0.877  -1.214 
Constant  -29.29  -31.79  -28.97  d*Matera  -1.310  -1.068  -1.424 
ln(Yi)  1.465  1.364  1.457  d*Messina  -1.521  -1.256  -1.621 
ln(Yj)  0.785  0.929  0.831  d*Milano  -1.235  -0.990  -1.368 
BORDER  0.583  0.760  0.507  d*Modena  -1.093  -0.875  -1.229 
RTA  1.083  0.166  -1.219  d*Napoli  -1.312  -1.077  -1.442 
inter-RTA  -0.480  0.155  -0.399  d*Novara  -1.128  -0.918  -1.263 
MONEY  0.061  0.065  0.061  d*Nuoro  -1.567  -1.297  -1.660 
d*Agrigento  -1.628  -1.370  -1.731  d*Oristano  -1.510  -1.204  -1.569 
d*Alessandria  -1.148  -0.936  -1.281  d*Padova  -1.158  -0.937  -1.291 
d*Ancona  -1.147  -0.940  -1.287  d*Palermo  -1.541  -1.280  -1.643 
d*Aosta  -1.327  -1.095  -1.440  d*Parma  -1.121  -0.910  -1.256 
d*Arezzo  -1.142  -0.930  -1.274  d*Pavia  -1.153  -0.939  -1.286 
d*Ascoli-Piceno  -1.179  -0.969  -1.316  d*Perugia  -1.279  -1.058  -1.408 
d*Asti  -1.175  -0.957  -1.297  d*Pesaro  -1.146  -0.929  -1.275 
d*Avellino  -1.296  -1.063  -1.411  d*Pescara  -1.275  -1.053  -1.398 
d*Bari  -1.366  -1.135  -1.494  d*Piacenza  -1.117  -0.907  -1.248 
d*Belluno  -1.135  -0.931  -1.275  d*Pisa  -1.183  -0.965  -1.312 
d*Benevento  -1.547  -1.258  -1.621  d*Pistoia  -1.132  -0.922  -1.261 
d*Bergamo  -1.167  -0.948  -1.306  d*Pordenone  -1.098  -0.886  -1.230 
d*Biella  -1.159  -0.956  -1.296  d*Potenza  -1.390  -1.151  -1.504 
d*Bologna  -1.164  -0.939  -1.296  d*Prato  -1.076  -0.876  -1.218 
d*Bolzano  -1.404  -1.175  -1.529  d*Ragusa  -1.522  -1.269  -1.629 
d*Brescia  -1.207  -0.987  -1.345  d*Ravenna  -1.159  -0.950  -1.294 
d*Brindisi  -1.355  -1.109  -1.464  d*Reggio-Calabria  -1.551  -1.293  -1.648 
d*Cagliari  -1.373  -1.126  -1.492  d*Reggio-Emilia  -1.077  -0.860  -1.210 
d*Caltanisetta  -1.444  -1.185  -1.545  d*Rieti  -1.271  -1.016  -1.361 
d*Campobasso  -1.341  -1.101  -1.449  d*Rimini  -1.236  -1.017  -1.363 
d*Caserta  -1.292  -1.063  -1.415  d*Roma  -1.427  -1.181  -1.555 
d*Catania  -1.463  -1.217  -1.574  d*Rovigo  -1.193  -0.968  -1.312 
d*Catanzaro  -1.595  -1.311  -1.672  d*Salerno  -1.222  -0.998  -1.352 
d*Chieti  -1.201  -0.977  -1.324  d*Sassari  -1.478  -1.239  -1.596 
d*Como  -1.136  -0.921  -1.271  d*Savona  -1.284  -1.046  -1.397 
d*Cosenza  -1.647  -1.373  -1.738  d*Siena  -1.131  -0.914  -1.254 
d*Cremona  -1.186  -0.972  -1.319  d*Siracusa  -1.189  -0.952  -1.305 
d*Crotone  -1.477  -1.218  -1.569  d*Sondrio  -1.269  -1.036  -1.386 
d*Cuneo  -1.177  -0.959  -1.309  d*Taranto  -1.365  -1.123  -1.485 
d*Enna  -1.525  -1.257  -1.617  d*Teramo  -1.164  -0.951  -1.293 
d*Ferrara  -1.182  -0.965  -1.311  d*Terni  -1.217  -0.994  -1.338 
d*Firenze  -1.222  -1.000  -1.356  d*Torino  -1.277  -1.049  -1.415 
d*Foggia  -1.533  -1.272  -1.630  d*Trapani  -1.416  -1.168  -1.522 
d*Forlì  -1.160  -0.946  -1.293  d*Trento  -1.277  -1.059  -1.409 
d*Frosinone  -1.240  -1.009  -1.357  d*Treviso  -1.139  -0.915  -1.271 
d*Genova  -1.251  -1.025  -1.382  d*Trieste  -1.204  -0.978  -1.326 
d*Gorizia  -1.148  -0.930  -1.271  d*Udine  -1.196  -0.984  -1.335 
d*Grosseto  -1.348  -1.093  -1.443  d*Varese  -1.132  -0.910  -1.264 
d*Imperia  -1.352  -1.119  -1.468  d*Venezia  -1.229  -1.008  -1.363 
d*Isernia  -1.121  -0.906  -1.250  d*Verbania  -1.280  -1.062  -1.406 
d*LaSpezia  -1.220  -0.997  -1.339  d*Vercelli  -1.051  -0.840  -1.177 
d*L'Aquila  -1.319  -1.082  -1.433  d*Verona  -1.176  -0.953  -1.307 
d*Latina  -1.194  -0.973  -1.324  d*Vibo-Valentia  -1.488  -1.199  -1.550 
d*Lecce  -1.386  -1.149  -1.502  d*Vicenza  -1.133  -0.910  -1.266 
d*Lecco  -1.160  -0.950  -1.294  d*Viterbo  -1.289  -1.054  -1.400 
d*Livorno  -1.235  -1.005  -1.354  Observations  130,321  130,321  130,321 
d*Lodi  -1.222  -1.000  -1.345  Number of pair    16,629  16,629 
d*Lucca  -1.135  -0.912  -1.258  R
2  0.776  0.724  0.774 
d*Macerata  -1.167  -0.963  -1.307  F-test  480.4  76,148  129,281 
d*Mantova  -1.130  -0.917  -1.264  Prob>F  0  0  0 
NOTE: Robust standard errors: no-asterisk p<0.01; * p<0.05; ** p<0.1; *** p>0.1. Cluster correction on pairs. See text for (a), (b), (c) methods.   12 
 
 
Table III: Some statistical tests on method (a), (b), and (c). 
Test  Statistic  Degree of Freedom  P-value 
Method (a) 
LR-T
d 2 c   435.60  9  0.00000 
LR-M
e 2 c   26,776.00  186  0.00000 
Method (b) 
BPLM Test
f  135,176.00  1  0.00000 
Method (c) 
BPLM Test
f  85,015.00  1  0.00000 
 
(a): time FE and importer country FE. 
(b): time FE and province-country pair RE. 
(c): time FE, importer country FE, and province-country pair RE. 
(d): Likelihood ratio test: importer country FE. 
(e): Likelihood ratio test: time FE. 
(f): Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test for RE. 
 
 














































































Table IV: Relationship between TC elasticities and average provincial per-capita income. 
Robust Standard Errors  Bootstrap Method with 1,000 replications  COEFFICIENT 
(a)  (b)  (c)   (a)  (b)  (c)  
Constant  -0.417  -0.362  -0.369  -0.417  -0.362  -0.369 
  (0.054)  (0.047)  (0.050)  (0.052)  (0.048)  (0.051) 
Yi/Ni  0.0223  0.0194  0.0197  0.0223  0.0194  0.0197 
   (0.0028)  (0.0025)  (0.0026)  (0.0027)  (0.0025)  (0.0027) 
Observations  103  103  103  103  103  103 
R
2  0.486  0.478  0.459  0.486  0.478  0.459 
NOTE: Yi/Ni is the average over period 1995-2004. Robust standard errors in parentheses in columns 1-3; standard 
errors  from  bootstrap  method  with  1,000  replications  in  columns  3-5  (similar  results  with  100  and  10,000 
replications): no-asterisk p<0.01; * p<0.05; ** p<0.1; *** p>0.1. See text for methods (a), (b), and (c).    13 
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Note: Colors in the maps represent mean-adjusted provincial distance elasticities; see text for methods (a), (b), and (c); first and last ranges in the legend are larger than 
other ranges because they include extreme values. 
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